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Abstract
We consider a process of costly majority voting where people anticipate that others have similar
preferences. This perceived consensus of opinion is the outcome of a fully rational Bayesian
updating process where individuals consider their own tastes as draws from a population. We
show that the correlation in preferences lowers expected turnout. The intuition is that votes
have a positive externality on those who don't participate, which reduces incentives to partici-
pate. We study the e®ects of the public release of information (\polls") on participation levels.
We ¯nd that polls raise expected turnout but reduce expected welfare because they stimulate
the \wrong" group to participate. As a result, polls frequently predict the wrong outcome.
While this lack of prediction power is usually attributed to an imperfect polling technology, we
show it may result from the reaction of rational voters to the poll's accurate information.
Keywords: Majority Voting, Correlated Preferences, False Consensus, Pre-election Polls1. Introduction
Pre-election polls regularly predict the wrong outcome. In the 1993 general elections in
Australia, for instance, almost every opinion poll had the Liberal party pegged as the winner
but Labor went on to win.1 In 2002, most polls got it wrong on the mid-term elections in the US
where Democrats were supposed to retain control of the Senate but in fact lost widely. In key
elections in many countries, opinion polls have shown as much as a 15-point margin of blunder.
Indeed, polling's biggest goof ever resulted in one of the largest political upsets in US history.
On the morning after the 1948 presidential election, the Chicago Daily Tribune's headline read
"DEWEY DEFEATS TRUMAN." The headline, still seared into the world's collective memory
more than 50 years later, was based on polls that predicted a victory of New York Governor
Thomas E. Dewey over Harry S. Truman, the incumbent president.
Burns Roper, son of pioneering pollster Elmo Roper, and George Gallup Jr., co-chairman
of the Gallup organization and son of another polling giant, review the events surrounding the
1948 presidential election.2 \The polls predicted a Dewey victory of between 5 to 15 percentage
points," Roper recalls, \and the labor vote was energized as Democrats worried about Dewey's
strength in pre-election polls while Republicans felt their candidate would win 'so they played
golf that day'." After the election the polling pioneers re-examined their methods and gradually
moved away from quota sampling, which questioned a set number of people from di®erent ethnic
and age groups, toward random sampling. But half a century later, Burns Roper and George
Gallup Jr. doubt whether their fathers' poll methodologies were seriously °awed. \I don't
think the polls were wrong in terms of measuring national sentiment," says Roper, \clearly
they were wrong in determining the election. I think the 1948 polls were more accurate than
the 1948 election."
In this paper we present a simple two-candidate voting model to formalize Roper's intuition.3
We assume that potential voters di®er in their beliefs about the level of support for either
candidate and that they use the information conveyed by the poll to re¯ne their expectations.
Belief heterogeneity occurs in our model because individuals, unsure about others' preferences,
use their own tastes as information in guessing what others like.4 In other words, individuals
1The polls were so unanimous that the Australian press referred to the election as \unlosable" by Labor.
2See http://www.hollandsentinel.com/stories/101998/new¡pollstrs.html.
3See Campbell (1999) for an alternative explanation of the unexpected outcome of the 1948 presidential
election. Campbell shows that an election can be won by a minority of \zealous" voters who have either a large
stake in the outcome, or very small participation costs, relative to the rest of the electorate. In contrast to the
analysis of this paper, polls play no role in Campbell's model.
4For example, Ross, Greene, and House (1977) report a study where students were asked whether they would
1see their own tastes as draws from a population and rationally use this information the same
way as they would use any other random sample of size one. Note that this pulls individuals'
beliefs about others' tastes towards their own tastes, thus creating a so called \false consensus
e®ect" (Ross, Greene, and House, 1977): people who engage in a given behavior estimate that
behavior to be more common than people who engage in alternative behaviors.5
The false consensus e®ect is a robust phenomenon that has been observed for a wide range
of preferences and opinions (e.g. Mullen et al., 1985). It seems especially strong when applied
to political opinions. Brown (1982) reports the choices of 179 psychology students who had to
indicate their preferred candidate in the 1980 US presidential election: Anderson, Carter, or
Reagan. In addition, they had to estimate the percentage of students in the class believed to
prefer each candidate. Supporters of all three candidates estimated signi¯cantly higher support
for their own candidate compared to the predictions of the rest of the class.6 Morwitz and
Pluzinsky (1996) report a strong false consensus bias for the 1992 US presidential election and
the 1993 New York mayoral election.7 Finally, a similar picture arises from an empirical study
of the 1992 Constitutional Referendum in Canada (Baker et al., 1995), where those planning
to vote \Yes" predicted a signi¯cantly higher proportion of \Yes" votes than those planning to
vote \No," and vice versa. The extent of the consensus e®ect in the Canadian referendum is
noticeable especially because a substantial monetary reward was o®ered for accurate estimates.
While the occurrence of the false consensus e®ect in voting processes has been well docu-
mented, its impact on voting decisions has not yet been studied. In this paper, we present the
¯rst analysis of majority voting when decision-makers rationally anticipate that others have
similar tastes. In other words, individuals with opposite preferences will have con°icting views
about which alternative is more likely to be favored by the majority.8
walk around campus wearing a sign. While those who agreed estimated 62% of the others would, those who
refused thought 67% would refuse.
5Dawes (1990) ¯rst noted that the de¯nition put forth by Ross et al. (1977) does not necessarily justify the
term \false." As explained in the text, when someone's decision is driven by her taste, which is seen as a draw
from a population, then it is perfectly rational to use this decision the same way as any other random sample
of size one. Only when the information about one's own taste is overweighed is the perceived consensus false.
In this paper we assume rational voters that do not overweight (own) information.
6Anderson supporters estimated 30.4% of the class preferred their candidate, while Carter and Reagan
supporters estimated 24.4% and 22.0% favored Anderson. Similarly, Carter supporters predicted 38.3% would
favor their candidate while Anderson and Reagan supporters estimated 34.1% and 33.6% favored Carter. More
dramatic di®erences were observed for the estimates of support for Reagan: those favoring Reagan predicted
this to be 44.5% while Anderson and Carter supporters' estimates were 35.4% and 37.9%.
7Clinton supporters' estimates for (Clinton, Bush) support were (94.2%, 5.8%), while Bush supporters'
estimates were (55.9%, 44.1%). Similarly, in the 1993 New York mayoral election, Dinkins supporters' estimates
for (Dinkins, Giuliani) support were (84.2%, 15.8%) and Giuliani supporters' estimates were (45.8%, 54.2%).
8Myatt (2002) considers the case where individuals receive informative signals about support levels, which
remain uncertain even in large electorates. In his model, voting is costless and there are more than two
2In our model, voting is voluntary: individuals ¯rst choose whether or not to participate in
the decision-making process, and those who participate then vote for one of the alternatives.
We assume that participation is costly so that it may not be socially optimal for everyone
to vote. Individuals' preferences re°ect idiosyncratic tastes, i.e. our model is one of private
values. In this case, voting against one's preferred alternative is strictly dominated by not
participating. Hence, the voting decision for those who participate is straightforward: one
should vote sincerely for one's preferred alternative.
While the model is ex ante symmetric with respect to alternatives and individuals, voters'
preferences are correlated. We show that this correlation reduces participation. One reason is
that correlation in preferences lowers the bene¯ts of participating since it lowers the chances
of being pivotal. To see this, consider ¯rst the case when preferences are independent and
suppose an individual believes that exactly one of the others will vote. Then the chance of
being pivotal is one-half, i.e. the probability that the other voter has opposing preferences.
If, however, preferences are perfectly correlated, the chance of being pivotal is zero when one
other person votes. In addition, when preferences are independent and both alternatives are
equally likely to be favored, votes have no positive externality on those who don't participate,
since any vote is equally likely to be in favor or against their preferred alternative. In contrast,
with correlated preferences any vote is more likely to be in favor and thus creates a positive
externality on those who don't vote. It is this positive externality that further reduces the
incentives to participate.9
Our main interest concerns the impact of pre-election polls on voting behavior. When peo-
ple use this public information to update their perceptions of others' preferences, it will correct
the views of some and reinforce others. As a result, the public information will reduce the
participation incentives of those who are reinforced in their belief that they belong to the ma-
jority. And it will stimulate participation of the minority group who realize they overestimated
the support for their preferred alternative. We show that the net e®ect of polls is to raise
expected turnout. However, the increase in participation levels due to polls is welfare reducing
because the release of public information stimulates the \wrong" group to participate. Our
results clearly demonstrate the possible negative e®ects of pre-election polls and may explain
why some countries bar them close to an election date.10
candidates. Myatt shows that multi-candidate support can arise in his model, in contrast with Duverger's Law.
We thank Tom Palfrey for pointing Myatt's paper out to us.
9Note that irrespective of whether preferences are correlated, one person's decision to participate creates a
negative externality for others who participate, since it reduces their chances of being pivotal.
10For example, in Italy and Luxembourg no polls are allowed in the month before the election. Other countries
with shorter bans include, Peru, Poland, Venezuela, and Switzerland. On March 9 of this year, Russia reversed
3We mainly focus on the case when the public release of information reduces all (perceived)
correlation in preferences, i.e. when large polls are conducted. In the resulting model, everyone
knows others' preferences are independent of their own and everyone favors one alternative
with probability p ¸ 1=2 and the other alternative with complementary probability. This type
of preference uncertainty is akin to the one studied by Ledyard (1981, 1984) and Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1985).11;12 Our model is closest to that of BÄ orgers (2004) who proves existence of
a unique symmetric equilibrium when preferences are independent and both alternatives are
equally likely to be favored.13 We extend BÄ orgers' analysis to the case where one alternative
is favored by a majority of the electorate. We show that, for some range of parameter values,
there is a unique equilibrium in totally mixed strategies for which total expected turnout is
independent of p. Moreover, the expected turnouts of both groups are equal, implying that
members of the \smaller" group participate more frequently to o®set the advantage of the
\larger" group. The election therefore ends in a tie in expectation, with negative implications
for expected welfare. We believe these results are novel to the literature.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the model and provides an equilibrium
analysis of simple majority voting. In section 3, we compare equilibrium and optimal levels of
voting. Section 4 studies the e®ects of public information release. Section 5 concludes. Proofs
of the propositions can be found in the Appendix.
2. Equilibrium Voting
There are n ¸ 2 individuals labelled i = 1;:::;n. Individuals can choose to participate
in the decision-making process at a cost, c > 0, which gives them the opportunity to vote for
one of two alternatives, B (blue) or R (red). Individuals who do not wish to participate bear
an earlier relaxation of the ban on pre-election polls. More generally, in a recent survey of 66 countries around
the world, the Foundation for Information/ESOMAR ¯nds that 30 countries have an embargo on the publication
of poll results on or prior to election day.
11In Ledyard's (1984) model, each individual knows her own characteristics, i.e. her cost and \location",
the spatial positions of both alternatives, and the distribution of others' costs and locations. Ledyard proves
existence of a symmetric equilibrium, but the possibility of multiple symmetric equilibria is not studied. Ledyard
also considers the case where the spatial positions of the alternatives are endogenized. He proves that the
resulting equilibrium is optimal in the sense that candidates choose identical positions which maximize welfare
and no one votes.
12Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) consider two types, or groups, of individuals: within a group, individuals
have identical preferences, but preferences are opposite between groups. They derive conditions for a (possibly
non-unique) symmetric equilibrium and study its limit properties as the size of the electorate diverges.
13This result sharply contrasts with the multiplicity of equilibria in participation games with equal and known
group sizes, see Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983).
4no costs and do not vote. The outcome of the voting process is determined by simple majority
(with a random tie-breaking rule) and applies to all n individuals irrespective of whether they
participated. Individual i's utility is 1 if her preferred outcome wins and ¡1 otherwise. From
these utilities the cost of participating is subtracted only if individual i participates.
The model is ex ante symmetric both with respect to alternatives and individuals in the
following sense. First, \nature" selects one of two possible states, 0 or 1, both of which are
equally likely. The realization of this state is not observed by the electorate, but individuals do
receive conditionally independent signals about the state. If the state is 0, individuals receive a
b signal with probability p ¸ 1=2 and an r signal with probability 1 ¡ p.14 Similarly, when the
state is 1, individuals receive r signals with probability p and b signals with probability 1 ¡ p.
Individuals' preferred alternative simply correspond to the color of the signal they receive. Note
that, independent of whether the realized state is 0 or 1, an individual with a preference for
one color rationally anticipates that others are more likely to favor that same color. Indeed, a
simple application of Bayes' rule shows that
P(other prefers bluejI prefer blue) = p
2 + (1 ¡ p)
2; (2.1)
and the same equation holds for red. The right side of (2.1) is a convex function of p, which is
minimized at p = 1=2 where its value is 1=2. Hence, individuals believe others are more likely
to prefer the same color whenever p > 1=2, while preferences are independent at p = 1=2. In
our setup, correlation of preferences arises via a fully rational Bayesian updating process.
We next describe equilibrium behavior. Since our model is one of private values and voting
is costly, voting against one's true preference is strictly dominated by not participating. Hence,
those who participate vote sincerely. We assume that the decision to participate is independent
of one's label and of one's preferred color as the model is ex ante symmetric. In other words,
we restrict attention to symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibria.
Let ° denote the probability that an individual participates. This probability will vary with
the cost of voting, c, and the size of the electorate, n. First note that with a ¯nite number of
people, there is always some bene¯t to voting (i.e. some chance of being pivotal) even when
all others participate. Hence, for low costs c · c, everyone participates with probability 1 (see
Proposition 1). In contrast, when c ¸ c = 1, the equilibrium probability of voting is 0. To see
14By restricting p ¸ 1=2, the 0-state makes a blue outcome more likely while the 1-state is more conducive
to red outcomes. This link between states and colors plays no role in what follows, and nothing would change
if it were reversed. This could be done, for instance, by considering values of p less than 1/2. To avoid trivial
duplication, we henceforth assume p ¸ 1=2.
5this, suppose all individuals di®erent from i decide not to participate. Then i's expected utility
of participating is 1 ¡c, while the expected utility of not participating is 1
2 ¢(1)+ 1
2 ¢(¡1) = 0.
Henceforth, we consider the more interesting case c < c < c so that both \staying out"
and participating occur with strictly positive probability. In the terminology of Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1983), we will consider only totally mixed equilibria in which no individual plays
a pure strategy. Of course, individuals are only willing to mix between participating and not
participating if they are indi®erent, which implies that the expected bene¯t of participating
equals the cost. The bene¯t of voting is zero unless the vote makes a di®erence, i.e. when it is
pivotal. There are two instances when individual i's vote is pivotal: either i's preferred color is
one vote short, in which case i's vote creates a tie, or i's vote breaks a tie. In the former case,
i's utility is raised from ¡1 to 0 and in the latter case it increases from 0 to 1. So the bene¯t
of being pivotal is 1 in both cases.
It remains to determine the probability of being pivotal, which depends on how many others
participate. Suppose, without loss of generality, that i's preferred alternative is B and consider
the case with an even number, 2k, of other participants. Then i's vote can only be pivotal





P(k others prefer B, k others prefer Rji prefers B);








Similarly, if the number of other participants is odd, 2k + 1, then i's vote is pivotal only when
k others vote for B and k + 1 others vote for R. The probability of being pivotal in this case
can be worked out as16







15An individual with a preference for B will have a subjective probability p for state 0 and 1 ¡ p for state 1.




pk(1 ¡ p)k and the same is true in








pk(1¡p)k, which yields (2.2).
16A B-voter will have a subjective probability p for state 0 and 1¡p for state 1. The probability that exactly
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6Some important insights can be gleaned from (2.2) and (2.3). First, note that p(1 ¡ p) is
a concave function that is maximized at p = 1=2. This implies that the probability of being
pivotal for a given number of other participants decreases with p for p ¸ 1=2. Second, comparing
(2.2) and (2.3) shows that Ppiv(2k ¡ 1) = Ppiv(2k) and Ppiv(2k + 1) < Ppiv(2k) for all k ¸ 1.17
Hence, the probability of being pivotal (weakly) decreases in the number of other participants.
This insight can be used to prove uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium (see BÄ orgers, 2004)
and to derive its comparative statics properties.18
Proposition 1. In the unique symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, individuals participate
with probability °¤(n;c;p) and those that participate vote sincerely for their preferred alternative.
(i) If c · c = Ppiv(n ¡ 1) then °¤(n;c;p) = 1, i.e. everyone participates.
(ii) If c ¸ c = 1 then °¤(n;c;p) = 0, i.e. no one participates.










n¡1¡kPpiv(k) = c: (2.4)
The equilibrium probability of participating, °¤(n;c;p), is decreasing in the degree of correlation
in preferences, p, the cost of participating, c, and the size of the electorate, n.
3. Welfare Analysis
Here we compare the equilibrium level of participation with the socially optimal level that
maximizes the sum of players' utilities.19 Consider ¯rst the case of n = 2 and c < c < c, where





p2 + (1 ¡ p)2:
17It is readily veri¯ed that Ppiv(2k + 1) =
k+1=2
k+1 (4p(1 ¡ p))Ppiv(2k) < Ppiv(2k).
18There is a simple connection between our complete-information setup with symmetric costs and models
where participation costs are privately known and distributed according to some known distribution function,
F(¢). Equilibrium behavior in the latter models can be characterized by a threshold cost, c¤: individuals with
costs below c¤ participate, while those with higher costs stay out. The necessary condition that determines the
equilibrium threshold level c¤ is simply (2.4) with °¤ replaced by F(c¤), see Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985).
19This is formally equivalent to maximizing the ex ante expected utility of individuals, since our model is
completely symmetric.
7To derive the socially optimal level, note that the sum of players' utilities is positive only
when individuals have the same preferences, which occurs with probability p2 +(1¡p)2. Both
individuals' utilities are 1 when at least one person participates while their utilities are zero if
neither participates. Hence, expected welfare is W(°) = 2(°2 +2°(1¡°))(p2 +(1¡p)2)¡2°c,
and maximization of W with respect to ° yields the socially optimal level
°
o(2;c;p) = 1 ¡
c=2
p2 + (1 ¡ p)2:
When p = 1
2, the equilibrium level of participation exceeds the optimal level and expected
welfare is zero: W(°¤(2;c; 1
2)) = 0. In contrast, when preferences are perfectly aligned (p = 1),
equilibrium participation is less than socially optimal and welfare is strictly positive. The next
proposition generalizes to arbitrary electorate sizes.
Proposition 2. Equilibrium participation is too high (low) when preferences are independent
(perfectly correlated). In equilibrium, expected welfare is zero when preferences are independent
and strictly positive when preferences are correlated.
BÄ orgers (2004) ¯rst demonstrated that when preferences are independent and both alternatives
are equally likely to be favored, voting is excessive (even though it is voluntary). The intuition is
that the decision of one person to participate creates a negative externality for other participants
since it reduces their chances of being pivotal. This negative externality is not incorporated
enough by individuals, which is why they participate more than is socially optimal.
A formal proof of the welfare results can be found in the Appendix, but the intuition is
quite simple. Individuals randomize between voting or not, so their expected payo®s of these
two options must be equal. Consider a voter who stays out. With independent preferences
there is a ¯fty-¯fty chance that the election outcome matches the voter's preference, so her
expected utility is zero. The same is true for other voters that stay out and for those that
participate, so total welfare is zero. In contrast, when preferences are correlated, a voter who
stays out has strictly positive utility because the election outcome is more likely to match her
own preference.
4. Polls
Here we study the e®ect of the public disclosure of information on the decision to participate.
Intuitively, when information is released that makes state 0, say, more likely, then those that
8favor blue are reinforced in their opinion that others also favor blue. As a result, they will tend
to participate less. In contrast, those that favor red adjust the likelihood that others favor the
same color downwards, resulting in a higher propensity to participate. Below we determine the
e®ects of public information disclosure on expected turnout and welfare.
Let I be a publicly observable signal, which provides information about the likelihood of
the realized state z = 0;1. For instance, when a poll is conducted among a thousand randomly
selected people, I could be the percentage that favors a certain presidential candidate.20 We
de¯ne the likelihood-ratio ® ´ P(I j0)=P(I j1) and focus, without loss of generality, on the
case ® ¸ 1 so that the 0 state is more likely. Note that when ® = 1, the signal I provides
no information and the model is identical to that of the previous section. When ® ! 1,
people know for sure that the realized state is 0 and that another's preferred choice is blue with
probability p and red with probability 1 ¡ p.
Before we present a general analysis consider again the case n = 2. Note that the presence
of the public signal I alters (2.1), i.e. the chance that another person favors the same color.
We now have
P(other prefers bluejI prefer blue, public signal I) =
®p2 + (1 ¡ p)2
®p + (1 ¡ p)
; (4.1)
while
P(other prefers redjI prefer red, public signal I) =
p2 + ®(1 ¡ p)2
p + ®(1 ¡ p)
: (4.2)
Since p ¸ 1=2, an increase in the likelihood-ratio, ®, raises (lowers) the probability that others
favor blue (red) given that I prefer blue (red). Let P(B jB;I) and P(RjR;I) denote the
probabilities in (4.1) and (4.2) respectively. Someone's vote is pivotal when the other person
has opposite preferences (irrespective of whether the other participates) or when the other has
the same preferences but doesn't participate. So the probability, °B, that an individual who














20We make the implicit assumption that pre-election polls elicit truthful responses. However, responses would
also reveal true preferences when people lie with known probability ¸ as long as ¸ 6= 1
2. (When ¸ = 1
2 polls
would always predict a tie.)
9A more precise information signal that raises the likelihood of the 0 state therefore reduces
(raises) participation incentives for those that favor blue (red).
It is interesting to compare the impact of the public information release on equilibrium
versus socially optimal levels of participation. It is readily veri¯ed that the welfare maximizing
levels of participation after the public signal I is released become
°
o











Hence, the public information signal I a®ects equilibrium and optimal levels in an opposite
manner. Information that makes blue more likely reduces the participation-incentives for those
that favor blue, but it raises the value of a vote for blue (since more people bene¯t), which
is why the socially optimal level of participation rises. Likewise, such information raises the
equilibrium levels of participation for those that favor red, while their votes are welfare reducing
since they lower the chance that the majority wins. For the n = 2 case, it is straightforward
to compute the welfare level that results in equilibrium and show it declines with ®.21 In other
words, polls unambiguously reduce expected welfare.
The analysis of polls becomes more complicated for general electorate sizes. We can, how-
ever, derive results for the interesting case ® = 1, i.e. when the release of the public information
signal, I, resolves all uncertainty about the state. This would occur, for instance, when a poll
is taken among a large number of people, which is commonly the case. In the resulting model,
everyone knows that (i) others' preferences are independent of their own and that (ii) each
other person favors B with probability p ¸ 1=2 and R with probability 1 ¡ p.





1¡p respectively. Hence, without correlation in preferences, the
expected turnout of the two groups is the same: 2p°¤
B = 2(1¡p)°¤
R. Conditional on either state,
each alternative therefore has the same chance of winning. The latter property generalizes to
electorates of arbitrary size, a novel result that contrasts with earlier work in this ¯eld. We say
21When those that favor blue/red participate with probability °¤
B(2;c;p) and °¤
R(2;c;p) respectively, then
welfare is given by
W = 2(1 ¡ c)
(1 ¡ 2p)2(p2 + (1 ¡ p)2)
(®p2 + (1 ¡ p)2)(p2 + ®(1 ¡ p)2)
;
which decreases with ®. Notice that welfare is 0, independent of ®, when p = 1=2 (see also Proposition 2).
10an equilibrium is quasi-symmetric when individuals with the same preference participate with
the same probability.
Proposition 3. Suppose it is commonly known that each individual favors B with probability
p ¸ 1
2 and R with probability 1¡p. In the unique quasi-symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium,
the participation rates of those who prefer B and R are given by °¤
B(n;c;p) = °¤(n;c; 1
2)=(2p)
and °¤
R(n;c;p) = °¤(n;c; 1
2)=(2(1 ¡ p)) respectively, with °¤(n;c; 1
2) determined in Proposition
1. Those that participate vote sincerely for their preferred alternative.
In the absence of any public information, expected turnout is equal to n°¤(n;c;p), while after
the poll total expected turnout is n(p°¤
B +(1¡p)°¤
R) = n°¤(n;c; 1
2). Recall from Proposition 1
that °¤(n;c;p) is decreasing in p for p ¸ 1
2, so expected turnout is higher after the poll.
Note, however, that members of the \minority color," red, participate more frequently. In-
deed, after the poll one should expect as many red as blue votes, even though only a (1 ¡ p)
minority of the population favors red. In contrast, in the absence of a poll those that favor blue
or red participate with the same probability, and the minority color is only expected to receive
a fraction 1¡p of all votes. In other words, polls raise expected turnout (and, hence, expected
costs) but lower the chance that the majority color wins.
Proposition 4. The public release of information, which eliminates all correlation in prefer-
ences, raises expected turnout but lowers expected welfare.
To grasp the intuition behind the decline in expected welfare, consider the ex ante expected
utility of voter i. Without loss of generality condition on state 0, so that voter i is more likely
to favor B. Others' preferences are stochastically independent, but they also more likely favor
B. In equilibrium, voter i plays a mixed strategy in which she randomizes between partici-
pating and not participating. Therefore, she must be indi®erent between these two strategies
and we can condition on the event where she does not participate. Without a poll, all voters'
probability of participating is independent of their preference, and therefore others are more
likely to vote for B than R. Hence, B is more likely to win, and voter i's expected utility,
conditional on not participating, is greater than zero. With a poll, each alternative is equally
likely to win (Proposition 3) and voter i's expected utility, conditional on not participating, is
zero.
115. Conclusions
In this paper we present a simple model where voters have probabilistic preferences over
two alternatives. Voters' tastes are correlated because they do not know the exact support for
either candidate. Instead, they use their own tastes to guess others' preferences. In such an
environment, pre-election polls can play a role as they help re¯ne voters' expectations.
The contributions of our paper are two-fold. First, we analyze simple majority voting with
correlated preferences and show that there exist a unique symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrum
(Proposition 1). This contrasts with earlier work in this area (e.g. Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985)
and extends the results of BÄ orgers (2004) who considers the special case when both alternatives
are equally likely to be favored. Like BÄ orgers we ¯nd that voting is excessive when preferences
are independent. However, correlation in preferences reduces participation incentives because
one person's vote creates a positive externality for others. As a result, participation levels are
less than socially optimal when the degree of correlation is high enough (Proposition 2).
Second, we show that after a pre-election poll, there exist a unique quasi-symmetric Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium (Proposition 3). In this equilibrium, members of the minority participate more
frequently and the election is predicted to end in a tie. Moreover, overall turnout is predicted
to rise. Polls thus have a negative e®ect on welfare since they increase participation costs and
reduce the chance that the majority wins (Proposition 4).
Our results are derived under the assumption that voters' bene¯ts are correctly measured by
the chance of being pivotal. Many political scientists doubt the empirical validity of this rational
choice assumption. Despite this critique, the predicted e®ects of polls make intuitive sense and
may explain why many countries ban their use close to an election. According to Burns Roper's,
the upset in the 1948 Dewey vs. Truman presidential election was not due to °awed polls, which
\measured national sentiment more accurately than the elections." Rather it was caused by
the electorate's reaction to the polls accurate information: \Democrats were energized as they
worried about Dewey's strength in pre-election polls, while Republicans `played golf that day'
as they were sure their candidate would win."
12A. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium follows since an increase
in °¤ raises the expected number of other participants, in the sense of ¯rst-order stochastic
dominance. Since Ppiv(k) is decreasing in k, the expected bene¯t of being pivotal on the left
side of (2.4) therefore falls with °¤. Finally, the left side of (2.4) is equal to c = 1 at °¤ = 0 and
equal to c at °¤ = 1. Hence, for c < c < c there is a unique 0 < °¤ < 1 satisfying (2.4). Recall
that the probability of being pivotal is decreasing in p for p ¸ 1=2. Hence, when p increases,
probability has to shift towards lower values of k to maintain (2.4) so °¤ has to fall. Similarly,
when the participation cost, c, rises, the left side of (2.4) has to increase so °¤ should decrease.
Finally, an increase in the size of the electorate, n, raises the number of participants in the
sense of ¯rst degree stochastic dominance and °¤ has to fall to maintain (2.4). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Expected welfare is simply measured by the total utility of the
group minus total costs. If ° denotes the probability of participation, then expected welfare









n¡k W(k) ¡ n°c (A.1)
where W(k) is the expected group, or electorate's, bene¯t when k individuals vote. Optimizing













W(k + 1) ¡ W(k)
´
= c: (A.2)
We next determine W(k). Suppose l people vote for R and k¡l vote for B. The group bene¯t
depends on how many people prefer R and B. Consider those cases in which r individuals prefer
R and n¡r prefer B, where r ¸ l and n¡r ¸ k ¡l. The group bene¯t is then (n¡2r) when
l < k¡l so that B is the majority color, and the group bene¯t is (2r¡n) when l > k¡l so that
R is the majority color.22 We can combine the di®erent cases by restricting l = 0;¢¢¢;bk¡1
2 c,
where bxc denotes the integer part of x, and assign the minority group of l voters once to the























´³ n ¡ k





To understand the binomials that appear in these expressions, note, for instance, that in the
top line we are drawing l people that prefer R from k voters and r ¡ l people that prefer R







22Note that the group utility is zero when there are an equal number of B and R voters.
13It is useful to rede¯ne the summation variable r ! r ¡ l in the ¯rst line, and r ! r ¡ k + l




























k+r¡l(n ¡ 2k ¡ 2r + 2l)





























The top line represents the bene¯t of the k votes to those that participate, while the bottom
line measures the positive externality of these votes for non-participants. To glean some further
insight, it is useful to decompose the bene¯ts of a vote to those that participate into a sel¯sh
bene¯t to the voter and a bene¯t to other voters. For this we need to distinguish whether an
even or an odd number of people vote. It is readily veri¯ed that for even k (A.3) is equal to











while for odd k (A.3) equals
Wodd(k) = kPpiv(k ¡ 1) + (n ¡ k)(2p ¡ 1)











Note that W(k) = kPpiv(k ¡ 1) when p = 1
2 and W(k) > kPpiv(k ¡ 1) when p > 1
2.
First, consider the case of no correlation: p = 1=2. We have W(k) = kPpiv(k ¡ 1) for all k
and it is readily veri¯ed that W(k+1)¡W(k) = Ppiv(k) when k is even and W(k+1)¡W(k) = 0









k )(°¤)k(1¡°¤)n¡1¡kPpiv(k) = c
respectively. Note that Wpiv(k) = Ppiv(k) when k is even and Wpiv(k) < Ppiv(k) when k is odd.
Moreover, Wpiv(k) falls with k for those k for which it is positive. Hence, more mass should

























n¡k¡1 Ppiv(k) ¡ c
o
= 0;
14where the ¯nal equality follows from the de¯nition of °¤. Since W(k) > kPpiv(k ¡ 1) when
p > 1
2, it follows that W > 0 in this case.
Finally, when preferences are perfectly aligned, all individuals favor the same alternative.
This situation is equivalent to a \volunteer's dilemma" game, where all individuals receive a
utility of 1 when at least one person makes the costly decision to participate. It is straight-
forward to show that the equilibrium level of participation for the volunteer's dilemma game
is given by °¤ = 1 ¡ c
1
n¡1, while the socially optimal level is °o = 1 ¡ (c=n)
1
n¡1 > °¤. To see
how strong the incentives to free ride are, note that the probability that no one participates is
(1¡°¤)n = c
n
n¡1. So even when the size of the electorate diverges to in¯nity, there is a chance
c > 0 that the preferred alternative is not chosen. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, take the point of view of someone who prefers B. Suppose k
others also prefer B, while n¡k¡1 others favor R and a total of l others vote. If l is odd then
a vote for B can be pivotal only when (l +1)=2 others vote for R and (l ¡ 1)=2 others vote for
B. Similarly, when l is even, a vote for B is pivotal only when l=2 others vote for R and l=2
others vote for B. These cases can be combined by noting that when l others vote, a vote for B
is pivotal only when bl+1
2 c vote for R and b l
2c vote for B. Since there is a total of k others who
favor B we necessarily have k ¸ b l
2c. Likewise, we have n¡k¡1 ¸ bl+1




R denote the equilibrium probabilities of participating for B and R respectively.





































2 c = c:
It is useful to rede¯ne the summation variable k ! k¡b l
2c. After this rede¯nition, the binomial















where we used b l
2c + bl+1































The sum over k can now readily be done, yielding
(p(1 ¡ °
¤
B) + (1 ¡ p)(1 ¡ °
¤
R))
n¡1¡l = (1 ¡ p°
¤





















2 c(1 ¡ p°
¤
B ¡ (1 ¡ p)°
¤
R)
n¡1¡l = c: (A.6)



















B ¡ (1 ¡ p)°
¤
R)
n¡1¡l = c: (A.7)
Notice that if we de¯ne °¤
B = °¤=(2p) and °¤
R = °¤=(2(1¡p)), the pivotal equations for B-voters


















The solution is given by °¤(n;c; 1









when p = 1
2.
We next prove uniqueness of the totally-mixed equilibrium. De¯ne °1 = p°¤
B and °2 =
(1 ¡ p)°¤
R and suppose, in contradiction, there exists an equilibrium for which °1 6= °2. Notice















2 (1 ¡ °1 ¡ °2)
















2 (1 ¡ °1 ¡ °2)
n¡1¡l = c: (A.9)















2 (°2 ¡ °1)
bl+1
2 c¡b l
2c(1 ¡ °1 ¡ °2)
n¡1¡l = 0;
a contradiction since (°2 ¡ °1)
bl+1
2 c¡b l
2c = 0 for even l and (°2 ¡ °1)
bl+1
2 c¡b l
2c > 0 for odd l.
Hence, °1 = °2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let p > 1
2. Before the poll, turnout is given by n°¤(n;c;p), and
after the poll, turnout is n°¤(n;c; 1
2). Recall from Proposition 2 that °¤(n;c;p) is decreasing in
p, so turnout is higher after the poll.
To determine expected welfare, we closely follow the setup in the proof of Proposition 2.
Suppose l people vote for R and k¡l vote for B, and consider those cases in which r individuals
prefer R and n¡r prefer B, where r ¸ l and n¡r ¸ k ¡l. The group bene¯t is then (n¡2r)
when l < k¡l so that B is the majority color, and the group bene¯t is (2r¡n) when l > k¡l so
that R is the majority color. We can combine the di®erent cases by restricting l = 0;¢¢¢;bk¡1
2 c
16and assign the minority group of l voters once to the R group and once to the B group. This










l!(k ¡ l)!(r ¡ l)!(n ¡ k ¡ r + l)!
£
(1 ¡ °R)

















l!(k ¡ l)!(r ¡ k + l)!(n ¡ r ¡ l)!
£
(1 ¡ °R)








¡ n(p°B + (1 ¡ p)°R)c:
Again it is useful to rede¯ne the summation variable r ! r¡l in the ¯rst line, and r ! r¡k+l




















((1 ¡ p)(1 ¡ °R))
r(p(1 ¡ °B))




















((1 ¡ p)(1 ¡ °R))
r(p(1 ¡ °B))
n¡k¡r (n ¡ 2k ¡ 2r + 2l)
¡ n(p°B + (1 ¡ p)°R)c:























(k ¡ 2l) ¡ nc°
¤(n;c; 1
2);
were we used p°¤
B = (1 ¡ p)°¤
R = 1
2°¤(n;c; 1










(k ¡ 2l) = kPpiv(k ¡ 1)















n¡k¡1 Ppiv(k) ¡ c
o
= 0;
independent of p. Q.E.D.
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